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Abstract
We examine the prudential implications of the co-existence between the standardized approach
and the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, as defined in the new Basle Accord. We consider
a model in which sophisticated banks, eligible for the IRB approach, and unsophisticated banks,
eligible for the standardized approach, allocate their loan portfolio between high-risk and low-
risk borrowers. We find that the co-existence between the two regimes may induce sophisticated
banks to decrease risk-taking, but encourage unsophisticated banks to increase risk-taking. The
risk reallocation effects are stronger when competition is more intense.
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In June 1999, the Basel Committee issued a first consultative paper "A New Capital Adequacy
Framework" to replace the 1988 Accord. With regard to the minimum regulatory capital
requirements, the consultative paper proposes a two-layer regime for the capital treatment of
credit risk, with (i) a revised standardized approach, where risk-weights would be partially based
on external ratings, and (ii) a brand-new internal ratings-based approach (IRB), where risk-
weights would be based on banks’ own assessments of credit risk. Other important modifications
of the minimum capital requirements are a revised treatment of credit risk mitigation techniques
and asset securitization, and the introduction of explicit capital charges for operational risk. The
document also suggests complementing the minimum capital requirements with two additional
pillars: a supervisory review process and an effective use of market discipline. In January 2001
and in April 2003, the Committee issued two additional consultative papers "The New Basel
Accord, Consultative paper" and "The New Basel Accord" addressing a number of issues left
open in the first document, especially regarding the structure and the calibration of the IRB
approach.
The Committee outlined several objectives in revising the Basel Accord: improving the risk-
sensitivity of the capital requirements, reducing the scope for regulatory arbitrage, and providing
more flexibility in the calculation of the capital requirements. The Basel Committee recognized
that the "broad brush" nature of the current Accord (where required capital generally does not
differ by the degree of risk) encourages regulatory arbitrage. The problem of regulatory arbitrage
has been largely studied in the theoretical literature on capital requirements (see below).2
The two–layer capital framework proposed for credit risk implies that in the segment of
corporate borrowers, banks eligible for the standardized approach will face very different capital
requirements than those eligible for the IRB approach. For banks using the standardized
approach, the capital requirements for claims on corporate borrowers will still look like a risk-
insensitive leverage ratio: only a minor fraction of corporate borrowers dispose of an external
rating and the new risk-weighting framework for that kind of borrower deviates from the
traditional 100% risk-weight only for very high or low ratings. By contrast, banks eligible for the
IRB approach will face risk-sensitive capital requirements: the internal rating coverage is large
for all types of corporate borrowers and the risk-weighting scheme for that regime will be fine-
tuned, as indicated in the second consultative document. The transition to a two-layer capital
framework for credit risk is important, as this type of risk constitutes the core of regulatory
capital requirements: for the average G-10 international bank, credit risk makes up about 95% of
total capital requirements.
The higher degree of risk-sensitivity provided by the IRB approach is certainly welcome, in
particular when we consider the extensive literature arguing that uniform capital requirements
can induce banks to increase risk-taking and result in a higher default probability (Kim and
Santomero, 1988, Gennotte and Pyle, 1991, Rochet, 1992 and Blum, 1999, Repullo, 2002).
1 At
the same time, however, the co-existence of the IRB approach with the standardized approach
can raise concerns regarding the risk behavior of the banks that will still have to comply with the
second – much less risk-sensitive – regime. In most countries, large sophisticated banks (the
more likely to be eligible for the IRB approach) still compete with smaller and less sophisticated
banks (the more likely to be eligible for the standardized approach) in important segments of the3
domestic loan market. With the two-layer capital requirement framework, this means that
sophisticated and unsophisticated banks will have to comply with a different capital requirement
when competing for the same borrower. When capital requirements are binding, this can affect
the competitiveness of sophisticated banks and unsophisticated banks in the various risk
segments and distort the portfolio allocation by the two categories of banks.
The Basel Committee's proposals have stimulated an intense academic research. A large number
of paper have been dedicated to credit risk modeling, with a particular focus on the consistency
between the IRB risk-weighting framework and the empirical evidence on credit risk. Frey and
McNeil (2002) address the non-coherence of VaR as a risk measure in the context of portfolio
credit risk. They show that VaR is not subadditive, which questions its use for the definition of
capital requirements, as is proposed under the new Basel Accord. Jackson, Perraudin and Saporta
(2002) compare the solvency standard implied by the new Accord to the solvency standard banks
choose by their own capital setting decision. They conclude that for large international banks, the
minimum regulatory capital requirement would not be binding. A smaller number of papers look
at the new Basel Accord from an incentive perspective. Décamps, Roger and Rochet (2002)
examine the optimal mix between the three pillars. They show that market discipline can reduce
the minimum capital requirement needed to prevent moral hazard. Altman and Saunders (2001)
compare the capital charges under the Standardized Approach to those obtained under the
foundation Internal Ratings-Based (IRB). They argue that for banks with an average quality
portfolio, there is no incentive to shift from the standardized to the foundation IRB approach.
Finally, Kirstein (2002) examines whether banks have an incentive to reveal the quality of their
loan portfolio under the IRB approach. He comes to the conclusion that this is the case only if
                                                                                                                                                          
1 Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Santos (1999) find the opposite result. For a survey of this literature, see Berger,4
the regulator validates the internal ratings and imposes a fine on the banks that overestimated the
quality of their loans.
The present paper belongs to the literature focusing on the incentives created by the new Basel
Accord. We try to assess the impact of the co-existence between the standardized approach and
the IRB approach on the portfolio allocation by sophisticated and unsophisticated banks. We also
examine how competition intensity and the degree of risk-differentiation of the capital
requirements affect sophisticated banks' preference for the IRB approach. While the model
combines the traditional ingredients of the literature on capital requirements, it is the first to
analyze the competitive interaction between banks eligible for the different regulatory regimes
defined in the new Accord. The setup of the model is the following. Banks are risk-neutral and
have limited liability. They can allocate their loan portfolio between a high-risk borrower
segment and a low-risk borrower segment, which differ in their sensitivity to the state of nature.
Banks fund themselves through deposits and equity, and they have to comply with a minimum
capital requirement. Bank deposits are fully insured at a zero premium. The two-layer capital
requirement framework proposed in the consultative paper is approximated as follows.
Unsophisticated banks have to comply with a simple minimum ratio between capital and total
assets – the standardized approach. For sophisticated banks, the capital requirements reflect the
bank’s portfolio allocation between high-risk and low-risk borrowers – the IRB approach.
Using this modeling framework, we find that the introduction of the two-layer approach for
credit risk may lead sophisticated banks to decrease risk-taking, but induce unsophisticated
banks to increase risk-taking. The intuition for this result is that unsophisticated banks enjoy a
competitive advantage in the high-risk segment, where they have to hold less capital than the
                                                                                                                                                          
Herring, and Szegö (1995).5
sophisticated bank, while they suffers a competitive disadvantage in the low-risk segment, where
they have to hold more capital than their sophisticated competitors. Another finding is that
sophisticated banks' preference for the IRB approach is positively related to competition
intensity and to the degree of risk-differentiation of the IRB capital requirement. A third finding
is that the introduction of the two-layer approach makes low-risk borrowing cheaper compared to
high-risk borrowing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In sections 3
and 4, we assess the impact of the introduction of the two-layer capital framework on bank
portfolio allocation and on lending interest rates. In section 5, we look at the conditions under
which sophisticated banks voluntarily apply for the IRB approach. Section 6 summarizes the
results and draws implications for the new capital adequacy framework and its implementation.
2 The model
2.1 Main features of the model
We use a two-period model with two possible futures states of nature ("good" and "bad") to
analyze portfolio and leverage decisions of risk-neutral banks facing high-risk and low-risk
borrowers. Banks differ in their degree of sophistication and are eligible in different regulatory
regimes: unsophisticated banks can only apply for the standardized approach while sophisticated
banks can apply for the IRB approach. We consider two basic types of competitive
environments: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly.6
2.2 Representative borrowers
The loan market is divided into two segments, represented by a low-risk and a high-risk
borrower. The two types of borrowers differ in their sensitivity to the state of nature.
The low-risk representative borrower, indexed by  l , can invest in a project whose return per unit
of investment is  ) 1 ( U +  in the state "good" and  ) 1 ( U -  in the state "bad". U  is the return of the
project, before operating costs. The investment generates a quadratic operating cost for the
borrower, equal to 
2
l Q , where  l Q  is the amount invested. The loan contract specifies the
repayment of a fixed interest rate  l r  plus principal in the state "good" and the bank's seizing of
the residual value  l Q U) 1 ( -  of the investment in the state "bad". With limited liability, the
maximization program for the low-risk borrower is
2 ) ( max l l l G l
Q
Q Q r U W
l
- - = p ,
where  G p  is the probability of the state "good".
Differentiating with respect to  l Q  and solving for  l r , we obtain the inverse loan demand function
for the low-risk representative borrower
G l l Q U r p / 2 - = .
The high-risk representative borrower, indexed by  h, can invest in a project whose return per
unit of investment is  ) 1 ( kU + in the state "good" and  ) 1 ( kU -  in the state "bad", with  k >1. The
inverse loan demand function for the representative high-risk borrower is
G h h Q kU r p / 2 - = .7
We use a linear specification of (inverse) loan demand as this improves the tractability of the
model, in particular with regard to the expression of the interest rates and quantities prevailing at
equilibrium. In the competitive model, the predictions of the model would hold for any
downward sloping demand function.
2 The inverse loan demand functions imply that the level of
interest rate in each borrower segment is a decreasing function of the amount of loans granted to
this segment.
2.3 Banks
All banks have the same size, measured by their total assets  A.
3 In the derivation of the results,
A is normalized to unity without any loss of generality.
Banks fund their loans through deposits  D and equity. Banks’ deposits are fully insured at a zero
premium. Accordingly, the depositors do not care about banks' risk or capital adequacy. They are
ready to supply an unlimited amount of deposits at the risk-free interest rate, set to zero for
simplicity. The assumption that banks deposits are fully insured at a zero or flat premium is quite
standard.
4
Banks choose the allocation of their total assets between the two borrower segments. A
proportion  p  is invested in loans to low-risk borrowers, a proportion 1- p  is invested in loans to
high-risk borrowers. In the state "good", banks receive 1+ l r  per unit of loans granted to low-risk
                                                
2 In a Cournot oligopoly, the use of a non-linear demand function would require the imposition of additional
conditions on its convexity (loan demand must not be too convex). Otherwise, the profit function is not necessarily
concave. Tirole (1993) p. 225.
3 We assume that  A is fixed in order to focus the analysis on banks' portfolio allocation between high-risk and low-
risk borrowers.  A can, for example, be defined as the cost efficient level of activity in the presence of economies of
scale.
4 See Merton (1977), Furlong, and Keeley (1989), Gennotte and Pyle (1991), Rochet (1992), Boot, Dezelan and
Milbourn (2000) and Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000).8
borrowers and 1+ h r , per unit of loans to high-risk borrowers. In the state "bad", banks receive
U - 1 , respectively,  kU - 1  per unit of loan.
We assume that in the state “good”, all banks meet their obligations to the depositors and that in
the state “bad”, all banks default.
 The assumption that banks default in at least one state of nature
is standard.
 5 Otherwise, the presence of deposit insurance would be of no value for the banks
and for its depositors. The combination of banks' limited liability and of deposit insurance imply
that banks (i) prefer to collect deposits than to raise capital and (ii) prefer high-risk to low-risk
loans (see also Keeley and Furlong, 1989). These two ingredients traditionally serve as a
motivation for banking regulation.
2.4 Capital requirement under the current Accord
Under the current Accord, only the standardized approach is available for credit risk. For
corporate and retail borrowers, it specifies a unique risk-weight of 100%. Accordingly, we proxy
the capital requirement with the simple capital ratio  A c C ￿ = . Both sophisticated banks and
unsophisticated banks have to comply with this capital requirement.
2.5 Capital requirement under the new Accord: two-layer framework
Under the new Accord, two main approaches are available: the standardized approach and the
IRB approach. Unsophisticated banks, indexed by  u , are unable to credibly communicate to the
regulating authority how they have allocated their loan portfolio between the two borrower
segments. This means that the regulator cannot observe the shares of the portfolio  u p  and 1- u p
                                                
5 Furlong and Keeley (1989), Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo also consider a model with two
states of the nature, where banks default in one state. Merton (1977) and Gennotte and Pyle (1991) consider a
continuous distribution of portfolio returns. For some realizations of the return, the bank defaults.9
allocated by the bank to low-risk and high-risk borrowers. As a result, unsophisticated banks
have to comply with the standardized approach that imposes a minimum capital requirement
derived from a simple capital ratio  A c Cu ￿ = . This regime is a fair approximation of the
standardized approach proposed in the consultative paper, since most corporate borrowers have
no external rating and thus fall in the 100% risk-weighted category.
Sophisticated banks, indexed by  s , can credibly communicate to the regulator their portfolio
allocation through their internal rating system, and are therefore eligible for the IRB approach.
Assuming that sophisticated banks voluntarily apply for the IRB approach
6, they are subject to a
capital requirement that reflects the risk profile of their loan portfolio. The capital requirement
for sophisticated banks is equal to  A b c p A b c p C s s s ) )( 1 ( ) ( + - + - = , where b is a risk-
differentiation factor, and  ) ( b c - and  ) ( b c +  can be seen as the risk-weights applicable to low-
and high-risk-borrowers respectively. The rationale for the differentiation of the capital
requirement is that the recovery values of loans to low- and high-risk borrowers in the state of
nature "bad" are different. This is consistent with the IRB framework, where the risk-weight is a
function of the loss given default as well as of the probability of default.
7
Our definition of the two-layer capital requirement implies that sophisticated banks are allowed
to hold less capital than unsophisticated banks for low-risk borrowers, but are required to hold
more capital for high-risk borrowers. This is a reasonable assumption, if we consider that the
100% risk-weight should cover the risk of an average-quality loan portfolio.
                                                
6 In section 4, we examine the conditions under which sophisticated banks voluntarily apply for the IRB.
7 The case where borrowers differ in their probability of default is examined in appendix B.10
Throughout the paper, we assume that banks' degree of sophistication is exogenous. Today, we
observe significant differences between banks in their ability to model credit risk. In that context,
it seems justified to consider that in the short and medium term, a large number of small
unsophisticated banks will have to use the standardized approach, while large sophisticated
institutions will be eligible for the IRB approach. In the long run, however, banks will certainly
adjust their investment in risk management techniques to the new regulatory framework, so that
their degree of sophistication becomes endogenous.
2.6 Bank maximization program under the current Accord
Banks maximize the expected value of their equity, net of the initial investment. They have to
determine the allocation  p  of their portfolio between the two borrowers segments and their
liability structure  D under the constraint imposed by the capital requirement  C A D - £ .
Because we assume that banks always default in the state of nature "bad" and that their deposits
are fully insured by the deposit insurance scheme, the profit maximization program considers
only the pay-off for the state of nature good.
8 The maximization program is
) ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ) , ( max
,
D A D r A p r pA D p V h l G
D p
- - - + - + + ￿ =p  (2.1)
such that
C A D - £ .
Under the current Accord, the capital requirement for the two types of banks implies
                                                
8 Formally, this program is obtained by defining the value of the bank as the NPV of the bank’s assets minus the
NPV of its liabilities, plus the NPV of the put issued "for free" by the deposit insurance scheme (Furlong and11
cA A C A D - = - £   (2.2)
The maximization program is increasing in  D, which implies that the capital requirement
constraint (2.2 ) is binding. We can therefore redefine our problem as an unconstrained
maximization program by substituting the capital requirement constraint as an equality in (2.1).
The only remaining decision variable is the bank's portfolio allocation  p  between the two
borrower segments.
The maximization program for the two types of banks can be rewritten as
cA cA A r A p r pA p V h l G
p
- - - + - + + ￿ = )] ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( max p
or
cA r p r p A p V G h l G
p
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( max p p - - - + ￿ ￿ = (2.3)
2.7 Bank maximization program under the new Accord
Under the new Accord, the capital requirements imply
cA A C A D u u - = - £  for unsophisticated banks and (2.4)
( ) A b c p A b c p A C A D s s s s ) )( 1 ( ) ( + - + - - = - £  for sophisticated banks. (2.5)
Since the capital requirements are binding, the maximization program for an unsophisticated
bank can be written as
                                                                                                                                                          
Keeley, 1989). The put has a strike price equal to the full repayment of the deposits guaranteed by the deposit
insurance scheme (Merton, 1977).12
cA r p r p A p V G h u l u G u
pu
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( max p p - - - + ￿ = (2.6)
and the maximization program for a sophisticated bank can be written as
] ) 2 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( [ ) ( max b p c A r p r p A p V s G h s l s G s
ps
- + - - - + ￿ = p p . (2.7)
3 Equilibrium under the old Accord and under the new Accord: perfect competition
A proper assessment of the effects of the new Accord requires that we define a benchmark. This
benchmark is the competitive equilibrium prevailing under the current Accord. The results in this
section are derived under the assumption that there is an infinitely elastic supply of capital. In
appendix A, we show that relaxing this assumption does not affect the predictions of the model.
3.1 Equilibrium under the current Accord: standardized approach only
Under the current Accord, all banks have the same maximization program (2.3). The first-order
condition is
0 ) ( = + - l h G r r p .  (3.1)
With perfect competition, banks make zero profits. Combining this condition with the first-order
condition, we find that the equilibrium interest rates on the two segments are identical
9 and given
by
                                                
9 This reflects the assumption that banks always default in the state of nature "bad", i.e. they do not care about the
recovery value of their loans. We could add an "intermediate" state of nature, where banks do not default, although
they lose money on their loans. Assuming that high-risk loans have a lower recovery value than low-risk loans in the
state of nature "intermediate", they would pay a higher interest rate at equilibrium. But the interest rate differential
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= (3.4)
Because we have k >1, (3.3) and (3.4) imply that  l h Q Q > , i.e., there is more lending to the high-
risk segment than to the low-risk segment.
We now have our benchmark. Under the current Accord, i.e., when only the standardized
approach is available, and with perfect competition, our model predicts that the interest rate
prevailing on the two segments are equal. The two bank categories are indifferent regarding their
portfolio allocation between the two borrowers segments. The share of the portfolio allocated to
the low-risk segment by the average bank is equal to  ) /( l h l Q Q Q p + = , with 0< p <0.5.
3.2 Equilibrium under the new Accord: two-layer capital framework
With the two-layer regime, the maximization program is given by (2.6) for unsophisticated banks
and (2.7) for sophisticated banks.
The first-order condition for sophisticated banks is
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 = + - + + - - l h G G r r b p p14
The first-order condition for unsophisticated banks is
( ) 0 = + - l h G r r p .
The first-order conditions cannot be satisfied at the same time for the two categories of banks.
This means that for at least one bank category, the optimal portfolio allocation is a corner
solution characterized by  p =0 or  p =1.
10
We look for a competitive equilibrium where each bank category operates at least in one
segment with non-negative profits. This unique equilibrium is obtained when sophisticated banks
specialize in the low-risk segment while unsophisticated banks specialize in the high-risk
segment. With this configuration, competition between sophisticated banks specializing in the
low-risk segment drives interest rates down to a level such that this category makes zero profits,











* .  (3.5)
On the high-risk segment, competition between unsophisticated banks drives interest rates down
to a level such that this bank category makes zero profits, i.e.,
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* .  (3.6)
With the levels of interest rates given in (3.5) and (3.6), an unsophisticated bank cannot enter the
low-risk segment without making losses, i.e.,  ( ) ( ) 0 1 0 , , , ,
* *
, < + - = > G i u i u l h i u bp p r r V p , while a
                                                
10 The possibility of corner solutions can be taken into account by writing the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions.
Define  0 , s m ,  1 , s m ,
0 , u m  and  1 , u m  as the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the inequality constraints  0 ‡ s p ,  1 £ s p ,
0 ‡ u p  and  1 £ u p . The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are  ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 1 , 0 , = + - + + - - - l h G G s s r r b p p m m  for
the sophisticated bank and  ( ) 0 1 , 0 , = + - + - l h G u u r r p m m  for the unsophisticated bank. If there were an interior15
sophisticated bank cannot enter the high-risk segment without making losses i.e.,
( ) ( ) 0 ) 1 ( 1 1 , , , ,
* *
, < - + + - = < G i s G i s l h i s p b p r r V p p . Consistently, for these levels of interest
rates, the first-order condition for sophisticated banks is always positive, i.e.,
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b r r V
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p , indicating that perfect specialization in the low-risk segment is
optimal for this bank category. At the same time, the first-order condition for unsophisticated




< + - =
¶
¶
G l h i u
i u
b r r V
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p , indicating that perfect specialization
in the high-risk segment is optimal for this bank category.
Hence, with perfect competition, the zero profit condition for the banks belonging to the category
facing the lower capital requirement on a given borrower segment ensures that banks from the
other category cannot enter that segment without making losses. For this reason, the other
configurations (specialization of the two bank categories in the same segment; specialization of
sophisticated banks in the high-risk-segment and of unsophisticated banks in the low-risk
segment; specialization of one bank category, with the other category indifferent between the
two segments) cannot be an equilibrium.
3.3 Assessing the impact of the new Accord
By comparing the competitive equilibria in section 3.1 (old Accord) and section 3.2 (new
Accord), we obtain the following result for portfolio allocation. First, while the two bank
categories would be indifferent with regard to their portfolio allocation between the two
segments under the current Accord, the introduction of the two-layer capital requirement would
                                                                                                                                                          
solution for the two bank categories, all the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers would be zero. But with the Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers set equal to zero, at least one of the first-order conditions would be violated.16
induce unsophisticated banks to perfectly specialize in the high-risk segment, and sophisticated
banks to perfectly specialize in the low-risk segment. From a prudential point of view, this
specialization is an issue of concern for two main reasons. First, it seems highly undesirable that
high-risk borrowers be concentrated in the portfolios of the banks with less expertise in credit
risk management and measurement. Second, because of the lack of risk-sensitivity of the
standardized approach, the possible increase in risk-taking by unsophisticated banks would not
be compensated by higher capital charges, and it could thus lead to a deterioration of the capital
adequacy in this bank category.
When comparing the equilibrium interest rates prevailing under the current Accord and under the
New Accord, we also see that the introduction of the two-layer capital requirement reduces the
level of interest rates on the low-risk segment, while the level of interest rates on the high-risk
segment remains unchanged. This is because the risk-differentiation of the IRB capital
requirement makes low-risk lending cheaper for sophisticated banks, while it does not affect the
cost of high-risk lending, the latter activity being performed solely by unsophisticated banks.
4 Impact of the introduction of the new Accord: oligopoly
In many countries, the banking sector is characterized by a high degree of concentration.
Moreover, banking activity requires different types of investment (reputation, screening of the
borrowers, branch network) that reduce market contestability. For these reasons, we examine
how departing from the assumption of perfect competition affects the prediction of the model.
We model imperfect competition using a Cournot oligopoly. This provides us with a convenient
way for varying the degree of competition intensity. In its original form, the Cournot equilibrium
characterizes competition in quantities. As shown by Kreps and Scheinkman (1999), the Cournot17
equilibrium can also be used to characterize competition in capacities followed by competition in
prices. A recent application of the Cournot oligopoly model to the banking industry can be found
in Boot, Dezelan and Milbourn (2000).
We consider that the banking industry consists of a Cournot oligopoly of  N  sophisticated banks
and  N  unsophisticated banks of size  N A/
11. It is natural to consider a symmetric solution,
where all unsophisticated banks and all sophisticated banks choose the same allocation of their
portfolio between the two borrower segments. Define  n s p ,  as the portfolio choice by the
representative sophisticated bank and  n u p ,  as the portfolio choice by the representative
unsophisticated bank.
The maximization program for the sophisticated bank is
] ) 2 1 ( [ / ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ / ) ( max , , , , b p c N A r p r p N A p V n s G h n s l n s G n s
ps
- + - - - + ￿ = p p (4.1)
The maximization program for the unsophisticated bank is
N cA r p r p N A p V G h n u l n u G n u
p n u
/ ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ / ) ( max , , ,
,
p p - - - + ￿ = (4.2)
For a Cournot oligopoly with  N  sophisticated and N  unsophisticated banks, the inverse loan
demand function of section 2.2 need to be rewritten as
G
n m
m s n s
n m
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  (4.4)
for the low-risk segment and
                                                
11 See Freixas and Rochet, 1997, for a generalization of the Cournot oligopoly to N banks.18
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for the high-risk segment.
For a sophisticated bank, the first-order condition is
0
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For an unsophisticated bank, the first-order condition is
0
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12
Using the symmetry conditions  n s p , = n m s p „ ,  and  n u p , = n m u p „ , , (4.6) and (4.7) can be rewritten as
a system of two equations with two unknowns: the portfolio allocations chosen by each
representative bank. Solving, we obtain
N
N U kN U N N N b
p
G G G
n s 8 4








                                                
12 We assess the stability of the equilibrium by considering a duopoly with one sophisticated bank and one































Varian, 1992, p. 288). Using our specification, we obtain  0 48 ) 4 ( ) 4 ( ) 8 ( ) 8 ( > = - ￿ - - - ￿ - >, i.e., the stability
condition is satisfied for a duopoly.19
N
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Equations (4.8) and (4.9) indicate that the optimal proportion 
* p  invested in the low-risk
borrowers segment is an increasing function of the differentiation factor  b for the sophisticated
bank, but a decreasing function of  b  for the unsophisticated bank.
 Moreover, the sensitivity of
the portfolio allocation to the differentiation factor increases with  N , i.e., with competition
intensity. When  N  tends to infinity, we have a perfect specialization of unsophisticated banks in
the high-risk segment and of sophisticated banks in the low-risk segment. These two results are
consistent with those obtained for perfect competition.
Note that the risk reallocation also affects the equilibrium interest rates on the two borrowers
segments. The interest rate prevailing on the low-risk borrower segment is given by
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while the interest rate prevailing on the high-risk borrower segment is given
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From (4.10) and (4.11), it is easy to see that the interest rate on the low-risk segment is a
decreasing function of the risk-differentiation factor  b, while the interest rate on the high-risk
segment is an increasing function of the risk-differentiation factor. This means that the
introduction of a two-layer capital requirement makes borrowing cheaper for high-risk borrowers
and more expensive for low-risk borrowers, compared to the situation where all banks had to20
comply with the simple capital ratio (i.e. where b=0), as under the current Accord. The reason
for this is that for sophisticated banks, the IRB approach increases the cost of lending to high-
risk borrowers and decreases the cost of lending to low-risk borrowers.
Overall, the predictions of the oligopoly model with regard to the impact of the introduction of
the two-layer capital requirement on portfolio allocation and on interest rates are consistent with
those of the competitive model. Appendix B generalizes the results to the case where high-risk
borrowers have a higher probability of default than low-risk borrowers.
5 Do sophisticated banks prefer the IRB approach?
Until now, we have simply assumed that sophisticated banks voluntarily apply for the IRB
approach. This is consistent with the fact that banks leading the pace in credit risk modeling have
been supporting the development of a risk-sensitive capital requirement. Still, it is important to
examine whether in our model, the banks having the choice between the two regimes would
prefer to be subject to a risk-sensitive capital requirement (like the IRB) rather than to a simple
leverage ratio (like the standardized approach).
5.1 Perfect competition
Consider the situation where all banks use the standardized approach, regardless of their degree
of sophistication. With perfect competition, equilibrium implies equality between the interest
rates in the two borrowers segments, as given by condition (3.2). Both sophisticated banks and
unsophisticated banks make zero profit and they are indifferent with respect to their portfolio
allocation between the two segments.21
Starting from this configuration, it is optimal for an isolated sophisticated bank to apply for the
IRB approach and to allocate its whole portfolio to the low-risk segment. The intuition is the
following. With perfect competition, the portfolio reallocation by a single bank does not affect
the equilibrium interest rates in the two segments. By applying for the IRB approach and by
switching its entire portfolio to the low-risk segment, the sophisticated bank is able to generate
the same expected interest income with a lower capital requirement. This strategy brings an
expected profit that is larger than the (zero) profit corresponding to an application for the
standardized approach.
To get the formal proof of this proposition, we now solve the maximization program (2.7) for the
sophisticated bank, and we check that this bank makes a positive profit when applying for the
IRB approach, while all other banks stick with the standardized approach. We define 
IRB
s p  as the
portfolio allocation chosen by the bank applying for the IRB approach. Since all other banks
stick with the standardized approach, the equilibrium interest rates on the two segments are given
by (3.2) and they are unaffected by a change in the portfolio allocation by a single bank.
Under these conditions, the derivative of the maximization program (2.7) with respect to 
IRB
s p  is
( ) G b p - 1 2 ,
which is positive, implying that the bank using IRB chooses perfect specialization in the low-risk
segment.
The expected profit of the bank applying for IRB with 
IRB
s p  =1 and the interest rates levels given
by (3.2) is equal to22
( ) ( ) G
IRB
s b p V p - = = 1 1 ,
which is larger than zero.¦
This strategy is optimal for any sophisticated bank. This means that with perfect competition, all




We now examine how imperfect competition can affect sophisticated banks' preference for the
IRB. Again, we start from a situation where all banks use the standardized approach, and we
determine the conditions under which a sophisticated bank will deviate and apply for the IRB
approach. We define 
STD
n s p , as the portfolio allocation of a sophisticated bank using the standard
approach.
When all banks use the standardized approach, they choose the same portfolio allocation,
regardless of their degree of sophistication
N
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Consider now that one sophisticated bank, indexed i , applies for the IRB approach. This bank
will choose the portfolio allocation
                                                
13 Note that at the competitive equilibrium, sophisticated banks using IRB again make zero profits. But no
sophisticated bank has an interest to deviate from this equilibrium, i.e., to apply for the standardized approach.23
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i s p V . The difference between
the profits obtained by the sophisticated bank when it applies for the IRB and when it applies for
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(5.6)
Expression (5.6) indicates that the sophisticated bank prefers to apply for the IRB when the risk-
















Note that the degree of risk-differentiation necessary for a sophisticated bank to choose the IRB
approach decreases with competition intensity. As  N  tends to infinity,  b tends to zero. This
indicates that with market conditions close to perfect competition, a small - but positive - risk-
differentiation factor is sufficient to induce a bank to apply for the IRB. This is consistent with
the results in section 5.1.24
Of course, as other sophisticated banks choose the same strategy, the attractiveness of an IRB













which is larger than  b.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we assessed the prudential implications of the two-layer capital requirement
framework proposed in the new Accord by looking at the competitive interaction between
sophisticated and sophisticated banks. Our main finding is that the introduction of a two-layer
capital requirement framework may encourage sophisticated banks (eligible for the IRB) to
decrease risk-taking, and induce unsophisticated banks (eligible for the standardized approach) to
increase risk-taking. The pressure for a specialization of sophisticated banks on low-risk
borrowers and of unsophisticated banks on high-risk borrowers would be especially strong in a
highly competitive environment. From a prudential point of view, this specialization is an issue
of concern for two main reasons. First, it seems highly undesirable that high-risk borrowers be
concentrated in the portfolios of the banks with less expertise in risk management and
measurement. Second, because of the lack of risk-sensitivity of the standardized approach, the
possible increase in risk-taking by unsophisticated banks would not be compensated by higher
capital charges, and it could thus lead to a deterioration of the capital adequacy in this bank
category. This looks like a high price to pay against the advantage of having risk-sensitive capital
requirements for sophisticated banks.25
The purpose of this paper is not to propose an alternative to the minimum capital requirement
defined in the new Basel Accord. Rather, it is to highlight that any regulatory capital requirement
- regardless of its degree of sophistication - may produce some undesirable effects when
implemented in a strictly mechanical way. This suggests that the two other pillars of the new
Accord - the supervisory review process and market discipline - have an important role to play as
complements to the minimum capital requirement. Under the supervisory review process,
supervisors are supposed to conduct an extensive analysis of each bank’s risk management
techniques and risk profile and they have the possibility to require banks to hold more capital
than the regulatory minimum. Under the market discipline pillar, banks will have to comply with
higher disclosure requirements regarding capital, risk and risk management. In that context,
supervisors and market participants should be in a better position to impose penalties - in the
form of additional capital requirements, increased scrutiny or higher risk premiums – on banks
using obsolete credit risk management techniques or reallocating their portfolio towards riskier
borrowers following the introduction of the new Basel Accord.
The paper also has an implication for the Committee's proposal in the second and third
consultative papers to divide the IRB approach into two sub-regimes, an "advanced" approach
and a "foundation" approach, for which part of the eligibility criteria is less demanding. At first
sight, the introduction of the foundation IRB should reduce the proportion of banks still having
to comply with the standardized approach and thus mitigate the risk reallocation effects analyzed
in this paper. The problem, however, is that only a minority of unsophisticated banks dispose of
the historical data on their loan portfolio performance that is necessary to comply with the data
requirements imposed for the foundation IRB. A systematic pooling of the data among banks
could solve the data problem faced by individual banks. The regulators and the various banks'26
associations have certainly a role to play in the creation of these data pools, for example by
acting as intermediaries that guarantee the confidentiality of data.27
Appendix A: Relaxing the assumption of an infinitely elastic supply of capital in the
competitive model
We assume that raising capital implies an opportunity cost  c r  per unit of capital. The opportunity
cost is an increasing function of the amount of capital raised by the banking industry  all C . For
simplicity, we define  all all c C z w C r ￿ + = ) ( , with  w ,  z >0.
With perfect competition, the maximization program including the opportunity cost of capital for
a bank of type t (with t =u, s ) is
) 1 ( )] ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( max c h l G
p
r C C A r A p r A p p V + - - - + - + + ￿ = t t t t t p
t
.
Using the capital requirement defined in section 2.5, we obtain the following first-order
condition for sophisticated banks
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 = + - + - + - - l h G c G r r r b p p .
For unsophisticated banks, the first-order condition is
( ) 0 = + - l h G r r p .
The first-order conditions cannot be satisfied at the same time for the two bank categories. Using
the same approach as in section 3, we examine whether the combination of corner solutions
u p =0 and  s p =1 is an equilibrium.
The competitive equilibrium is defined by a system of six equations with six unknowns,  l r ,  h r ,
c r ,  l Q ,  h Q  and  all C .28
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) specify the inverse loan demand functions for the two borrowers
segments
G l l v Q U r p / 2 - = (A.1)
G h h v Q kU r p / 2 - = (A.2)
Equation (A.3) specifies the opportunity cost of capital
all c C z w r ￿ + =   (A.3)
Equations (A.4) and (A.5) state that in a competitive equilibrium, net income just cover the
opportunity cost of capital for each bank category
( )= = 0 , , , , u c l h i u p r r r V 0 (A.4)
( ) = =1 , , , s c l h s p r r r V 0  (A.5)
Equation (A.6) specifies the overall amount of capital that the banking industry must hold at
equilibrium to comply with the capital requirements. Since sophisticated banks specialize on the
low-risk segment and unsophisticated banks specialize on the high risk segment, the overall
amount of capital can be expressed as a function of aggregate lending to each borrower segment
l h all Q b c cQ C ) ( - + = (A.6)
From (A.4) and (A.5), we know that at equilibrium, the interest rates levels in the two segments
are such that for the two bank categories, net income just cover the opportunity cost of capital.
Solving the system of equations, we find that for an unsophisticated bank entering the low-risk29
segment, net income would not be large enough to cover the opportunity cost of capital.
Formally, we have
( ) 0
) 1 ( 2 2
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
0 , , , ,
2 2 , ,
* * * *
, <
+ + ￿ ￿ -
+ - - + ￿ - ￿ ￿
= >
z c z c b z b
w U k z c U z b
bp p C r r r V
G G G
i u i u all k l h i u
p p p
,
under the condition that  b c ‡ , i.e. the capital requirement for low-risk lending is not negative.
The opposite holds for a sophisticated bank. If the latter enters the high-risk segment, net income
will not be large enough to cover the opportunity cost of capital. Formally, we have
( ) 0
) 1 ( 2 2
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 , , , ,
2 2 , ,
* * * *
, <
+ + ￿ ￿ -
+ - - + ￿ - ￿ ￿
- = <
z c z c b z b
w U k z c U z b
p b p C r r r V
G G G
i s i s all k l h i s
p p p
.
Hence, the combination of corner solutions  u p =0 and  s p =1 is an equilibrium and no bank has
interest to deviate from this equilibrium. This result is the same as the one obtained in section 3
under the assumption that the supply of capital is infinitely elastic. In the presence of the
opportunity cost of capital, the two-layer capital requirement framework still implies that
sophisticated banks have a comparative advantage in lending to the low-risk segment, and vice
versa. The only difference with section 3, is that the presence of the opportunity cost of capital
makes borrowing more expensive for the two-borrower segments. Accordingly, the amounts lent
to the two borrower segments are lower.30
Appendix B: Relaxing the assumption that the two borrower categories have the same
default probability
We now assume that the two borrowers' projects differ in their probability of success, but that
they have the same pay-off structure. The low-risk borrower's returns  ) 1 ( U +  per unit of
investment with probability  l p , and  ) 1 ( U -  otherwise. The project of the high-risk borrower
returns  ) 1 ( U +  per unit of investment with probability  h p , and  ) 1 ( U -  otherwise. We set
l h p p < , i.e. the low-risk borrower has a lower probability of default than the high-risk borrower.
For simplicity, we assume that defaults are independent across the two borrower categories. We
now have four possible states of nature: (i) with probability  l hp p , none of the borrower
categories is in default; (ii) with probability  ) 1 )( 1 ( l h p p - - , the two borrower categories are in
default; (iii) with probability  h l p p ) 1 ( - , only the low-risk borrower category is in default; (iv)
with probability  l h p p ) 1 ( - , only the high-risk borrower category is in default.
Assume now that banks default only in the state of nature where the two borrower categories are
in default. In a Cournot oligopoly with  N  sophisticated and  N  unsophisticated banks, the
maximization programs for the two representative banks are
] ) 2 1 ( [ / ) ) 1 ( 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ / ) 1 (
] ) 2 1 ( [ / )) 1 ( 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ / ) 1 (
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Solving, we obtain the following portfolio allocations for each representative bank
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(B.2)
(B.1) and (B.2) indicate that the optimal proportion 
* p  invested in the low-risk borrowers
segment is an increasing function of the differentiation factor  b for the sophisticated bank, but a
decreasing function of  b  for the unsophisticated bank.
 This result is the same as the one obtained
in section 4 under the assumption that the two borrower categories have the same probability of
default. With a larger b , the sophisticated bank has a larger comparative advantage in lending to
low-risk borrowers. Whether low-risk borrowers are characterized by a lower probability of
default or by a lower loss given default is irrelevant.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that banks are able to avoid a default only in the state of
nature where the two borrower categories do not default. In this case, the optimal portfolio
allocations would be
) )( 2 1 (
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= (B.4)32
(B.3) and (B.4) have the same implications as (B.1) and (B.2) with regard to the impact of the
risk-differentiation factor on portfolio allocation by the two bank categories. As long as banks
default in at least one state of nature, the number of states where they do not default do not affect
the predictions of the model.33
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